

## 《論文》

# A Comparative Study of German and Japanese Historical Reconciliation with Neighbouring Countries (Part II)

歴史和解の比較研究 —— ドイツと日本を事例に —— (後編)

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This thesis will evaluate Germany's and Japan's reconciliation processes from a comparative perspective. It is concluded that the relative success of Germany's reconciliation is because of the pragmatic reasons such as security, economical prosperity and the Cold War. Particularly, the commitment to European integration became one of the strongest incentives for Germany to reconcile with its neighbours. The process of reconciliation in Japan was slower than that of Germany, because of the continuity of political leaderships, impact of atomic bombings, geopolitical environment and other factors. While there is no universal model for reconciliation, it can be said that reconciliation is a long term process which can only be achieved through the coordination of the various actors from the top level to the grassroots level of the structure of the society.

Keywords : Reconciliation, Germany, Japan, history, World War II

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## Introduction

Japan and Germany, the two main perpetrators of World War II, are often compared in regard to how they handled the aftermath of that war. There is a shared perception that Germany is more successful in reconciliation with its neighbours than Japan. This thesis will evaluate Germany's and Japan's reconciliation processes from a comparative perspective. In the previous volume of the bulletin, the first section discussed the concept and theory of reconciliation focusing on nature, aspects, structure and process, and the second section evaluated Germany's reconciliation with its neighbouring countries. In this volume, Japan's reconciliation with its neighbouring countries is to be evaluated and finally, Germany's and Japan's post-WWII reconciliation processes will be compared.

## 3 Japan's Reconciliation with its Neighboring Countries

World War II ended over seventy years ago, but Japan's historical past still refuses to fade away quietly.<sup>1)</sup> As Yoichi Funabashi says, "Japan's inability to deal adequately with its historical legacy has prevented it from developing constructive security relations with its neighbors, which in turn has impeded the emergence of a multilateral security framework in the region. Japan can become a 'normal country' only if it addresses this legacy more earnestly and pursues a path toward historical reconciliation with its neighbors."<sup>2)</sup>

In this section, Japan's reconciliation with its neighbouring countries is to be evaluated.

The section has the same structure as the previous one; the first part will make an analysis based on the four elements of reconciliation, and the second part will assess processes of bilateral reconciliation, namely, Sino-Japanese and Korean-Japanese reconciliation.

### 3-1 Truth

Japanese governments have been reluctant to admit that Japan has committed wrongs in the Pacific War. Some argue that the reason for this reluctance lies in the high degree of continuity of Japan's postwar government with its wartime predecessor. While "the allied victors demanded that the postwar German government eliminate Nazi leadership, yet they kept the Japanese Emperor and many of his advisers in power to ensure stability."<sup>3)</sup> It is controversial to come to terms with the past atrocity without touching on the responsibility of the Emperor since he was Japan's supreme leader during wartime.<sup>4)</sup>

In the 1990s, several prime ministers apologized for Japan's war crimes and the Japanese government started to acknowledge that the wartime state and the military were responsible for 'comfort women.'

Today, Japanese people generally recognize Japan's wartime aggression and crimes against the comfort women and the Nanjing massacre. However, there is no generally accepted version of what happened in the Nanjing massacre. It is necessary to discover the truth, because finding the truth is an important element for reconciliation. As Charles Burrell claims, "given the gaps and conflicting evidence, the resolution might seek to define what the evidence does show and what we do not know. Then the unknown part might follow the current European trend of affirming a multiplicity of views, without the insistence on capitulation to one version."<sup>5)</sup>

### 3-2 Justice

It has been criticized that Japanese society, especially the Liberal Democratic Party and government, has been reluctant to undertake an honest look at the wartime behaviour of Imperial Japan.

Some criticize the unfairness of the Tokyo War Crimes Trials. Firstly, critics question whether the victorious allies were entitled to try the defeated. "By publicly demonstrating Japan's savage barbarity, the trial could also be used to justify the American use of atomic weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki."<sup>6)</sup> The atomic bombings are a symbol of absolute evil, often compared to Auschwitz,"<sup>7)</sup> even though they might have saved lives and shortened the war. The United States should answer for its killing of the innocent in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Hiroshima and Nagasaki have played a significant role as the origins for the peace and anti nuclear movement in Japan, but the victim feeling coming from them has prevented Japan from facing its aggressive past towards its Asian neighbours. As Paul Shallow claims, "the atomic bombings have sometimes functioned to absolve Japan of blame in the war and have relieved its citizens from the necessity of reflecting upon their wartime role."<sup>8)</sup> Japan tends to position itself as a victim, and its people are unfamiliar with the notion

to admit themselves as perpetrator. Yet, to argue that ‘you too have done wrong, so I should be forgiven my sins’ reveals ‘only a bleak poverty of spirit.’<sup>9)</sup>

Secondly, critics claim that at the time of the Second World War, there was no absolute prohibition of war nor was there a total ban on the first use of force, so it is impossible to charge Japan for this reason.<sup>10)</sup>

The third criticism is the procedural shortcomings of the Tokyo Tribunal. Among the eleven judges, only one had any background in international law. Furthermore, “the judges’ impartiality was compromised because eight of the eleven judges represented countries that were direct victims of Japanese militarism.”<sup>11)</sup>

The fourth criticism is that the tribunal was motivated by political considerations, given the fact that not only was Emperor Hirohito not indicted, but he was not even summoned as a witness.<sup>12)</sup> General MacArthur chose to use the imperial symbol to enhance his power and govern the country. By 1948, international political considerations “became more urgent than the administration of justice.”<sup>13)</sup> When China fell to the Communists, turning Japan into a bastion against communism became a priority. The United States and Great Britain lost their zeal for justice. They needed a stronger Japan as an ally in the Cold War, and for the sake of this political intention, Japanese war criminals could escape from being prosecuted. To stabilize Japan, the Occupation accelerated the return of many war criminals to power, which resulted in a continuity of Japan’s pre and postwar political leadership. As a result, the chances of achieving justice and developing democracy in Japan were lost.<sup>14)</sup> “That continuity goes a long way toward explaining the Liberal Democratic Party and government’s ongoing denial, obfuscation, and revision of Japan’s wartime deeds.”<sup>15)</sup>

In conclusion, Japanese war criminals were not prosecuted sufficiently thoroughly, because firstly, the Tokyo Tribunal was flawed, secondly, the Allied Powers took the political consideration prior to justice, and thirdly, the continuity of political leadership made it difficult for Japan to prosecute its war criminals by itself.

Another issue related to justice is compensation and reparation policies. The San Francisco Peace Treaty should have completed any legal liability of Japan, its nationals and its companies toward forced labourers during World War II. Japan gave up its claims to Japanese overseas property, which was seized and disposed of by the parties to the San Francisco Treaty for the claimants against Japan.<sup>16)</sup> However, neither China nor Korea was represented at the peace conference in San Francisco,<sup>17)</sup> because they saw themselves as having unresolved historical claims against Japan. The Treaty was concluded in an atmosphere in which the Cold War required Japan to turn into a prosperous ally in the war against communism. The Western alliance wished to settle all the claims against Japan by former adversaries quickly. Given the context of the Cold War, mobilizing Japan in the effort to contain communism was seen as absolutely necessary.<sup>18)</sup> Furthermore, as a part of compensation for the horrors of World War II, Japan started economic aid programmes to Asian countries including Korea and China. However, neither of them thinks that Japan has made enough effort to offer compensation.

### 3-3 Mercy

Reconciliation needs not only acknowledgement of wrongs on the side of victimizers but also readiness for acceptance on the side of victims. It is arguable whether Asian countries are ready for it. Some contend that China and Korea are not willing for reconciliation with Japan because they know they could get “greater benefit from maintaining historical disputes with Japan than from seeking opportunities for reconciliation.”<sup>19)</sup>

However, after the recent and continuing economic growth of China and South Korea, the relationship between Japan and the two countries has now entered a new phase of competition and coexistence. They don't need to use the ‘history card’ any more. It is becoming a national interest of those countries to work toward creating a friendly political environment by solving historical issues.<sup>20)</sup>

### 3-4 Peace

After the Cold War, Japanese leaders faced a great difficulty settling Japan's place in the world. They could not decide whether to promote regional Asian federation building following on the experience of the European Union or to retain the U.S. alliance as the main determinant of Japanese foreign policy. While Japan has never been satisfied with its position in the U.S. alliance system, particularly with the presence of U.S. military bases in Japan, the vision of Asian integration is still too vague.

The Asian region is still far from any institutional unification. It will not have a security alliance, political union, or single currency in the near future. The concept of an “Asian Union” faces many obstacles. This is in part a result of the continuing legacy of the Cold War in Asia, most clearly symbolized by the divisions between the two Chinas and two Koreas. But other factors such as social, economic and geographic distances are decisive as well, which are far greater in Asia than in Europe. However, the biggest obstacle to the regional integration in Asia is the deep mistrust potential member states feel toward one another. Neither Japanese nor Chinese can confidently expect political or strategic leadership in Asia, and each fears the domination by the other, although it is not Japan but China who seeks a regional hegemonic role.<sup>21)</sup>

Still, more and more countries in the Asian region have stressed a commitment to “Asian values.” Thinking of the diminishing power of the United States in Asia, Japan cannot keep ignoring its Asian neighbours any more, but is forced to find a way to live in the region.

### 3-5 Sino-Japanese Reconciliation

The history problem between Japan and China is not only about the past, but about the present domestic conditions in both countries.<sup>22)</sup> In this part, what actors and activities at each level have contributed to reconciliation between the two countries is to be evaluated.

#### Top Level

Japan and China did not have official ties until the Joint Communiqué of 1972, . The

1970s is said to have been the “honeymoon” of the two countries, although their friendship was just based on the common interest against the Soviet threat, and war responsibility issues were not dealt with at that time.

The historical problem started early in the 1980s when the Japanese history textbook controversy gained the attention of its Asian neighbours. While Korea-Japanese reconciliation progressed remarkably after their joint declaration in Tokyo in 1998, Sino-Japanese relations has remained cold. This is partly because Japan and China belong to different social systems. Some contend that the resolution of the history problem has to wait until China becomes a free-market, liberal democracy. For those people, “democracy is a precondition for historical reconciliation between nation-states.” Yet, as Polish-German reconciliation shows, it can be progressed even though one side is under an authoritarian regime. As German Chancellor Willy Brandt successfully did in Polish-German reconciliation, Japanese political leaders might be able to lay the groundwork now so that process of reconciliation would progress smoothly in the future.

Political leaders could have a great influence not only on their own people but also on people of other countries in the era of widely developed media coverage and internet use. Japanese political leaders’ repeated visits to the Yasukuni shrine have influenced negatively the two countries’ reconciliation processes by harming the emotion of their neighbours. If Japan wants to reconcile with its neighbours, it needs to appeal to the people by reflecting the sensitivities in those countries, since reconciliation has to be promoted at the individual level eventually.

### Middle Level

Textbook dialogues played an important role to promote reconciliation in Europe. In Asia, while Japanese textbooks have understated the horrors, Chinese textbooks have often overstated the atrocities in order to stir up anti-Japanese sentiments and understate the peaceful efforts of the Japanese since 1945, in order to elicit more economic aid and more compensation from Japan.<sup>23)</sup> Although there is no single version of the past that can be accepted by everyone, historians and educators can create a less distorted picture of the past by interpreting evidence according to accepted standards of scholarship. They can perform an important task to advance the process of reconciliation by reviewing and reinterpreting the most disputed points of modern history.

Still, it is unrealistic to authorize a common textbook in East Asia as has been done in the European Union, because of the deeply entrenched institutional differences between Asian countries. But in the meantime, they can develop a common reference book, either a teacher’s manual or dictionary of history for teachers. In progressing this idea, the involvement of international institutions such as the Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook research or UNESCO could be helpful.<sup>24)</sup> Indeed, efforts toward developing a shared history between Japan and China are already under way, such as the collaborative research on the Sino-Japanese War. In addition, Common History Textbook

Committee of Japan, China and Korea published a joint textbook in 2005. This textbook was “produced not by government but by progressive researchers, teachers and citizens in three countries.”<sup>25)</sup> Although this textbook is not authorized by government and will not be in school curriculum in these countries, the achievement is noteworthy because this is the first attempt for those countries to have made a joint textbook. As Daqing Yang claims, “historians of the conflict between Japan and China should seek to transcend nationalism, which is, after all, the source of most inter-ethnic conflict.”<sup>26)</sup>

Another actor which represents middle level is quasi-diplomatic initiatives by the mainstream big-business community. From the 1950s until normalization in 1972, these business initiatives were central to Sino-Japanese economic relations.

### Grassroots

Underlying causes of conflict between China and Japan have not been sufficiently addressed yet. According to Daqing Yang, “ill feelings between China and Japan had already existed long before the end of the nineteenth century.” On the one hand, there is a Chinese literature of 1938 which characterized the Japanese people as “only half civilized”, on the other hand, “for many Japanese, the psychological struggle since the beginning of the Meiji era with the dual identity of being part of Asia and yet yearning to emulate the advanced West has often resulted in a sense of superiority vis-à-vis fellow Asians. These preexisting prejudices have only made the scars of war more difficult to heal.”<sup>27)</sup>

Still, there are some good examples which may contribute to mutual understanding between the two peoples. Today, being attracted by emerging China, more and more people are visiting China, and Chinese is the most popular foreign language after English among Japanese people.

The grassroots level is becoming increasingly important. Although governments can play useful roles as facilitators, reconciliation must go deeper and take place at grassroots level in order to last.<sup>28)</sup> Grassroots exchanges, especially among the younger generation, must be expanded to promote reconciliation. Governments have also recognized the importance of social interaction. One example of this is Jiang Zemin’s invitation to five thousand young Japanese people to visit China. Exchanges among scholars, educators and ordinary people contribute to reconciliation. Ultimately, the key to success in the reconciliation process lies in the commitment of people at the grassroots level.

### 3-6 Korean-Japanese Reconciliation

The Korean-Japanese relationship has been a tortured one for a long time because of “deep-seated enmity and psychological barriers stemming from the turbulent histories”<sup>29)</sup> which include Korea’s colonial subjugation to Japan.

### Top Level

Korea and Japan established formal ties in 1965, but their diplomatic relations remained

cold in spite of common alliances with the United States. However, reconciliation between the two countries has been improved significantly since the late 1990s.

In 1998 President Kim Dae Jung and Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi issued statements that “emphasized the positive aspects of the two countries’ relations while expressing admiration for each other’s accomplishments.”<sup>30)</sup> Furthermore, in the same year, Korea abolished the long-standing “ban on the import of Japanese popular culture,”<sup>31)</sup> which had been supported by older generations “as a hedge against Japanese cultural imperialism.”<sup>32)</sup> Around this time, the two countries’ relationship improved immensely. Although historical animosity has not been eradicated, as Koreans’ protests against controversial Japanese history textbooks and Prime Ministers’ visits to the Yasukuni Shrine have demonstrated, it does not lead to fundamental disruptions any more of Korean-Japanese relationship.

This positive change in the two countries’ relations relate to their common security interest. Facing the diminishing United States’ presence in Asia and the threat from North Korea, Korea and Japan deepened cooperation in security area, by conducting bilateral security meetings, joint naval exercises and officer exchanges. Another reason for the improved bilateral relations lies in Korea’s peaceful transition from authoritarianism to a democratic government in the late 1980s and 1990s. The third reason is Korea’s economic development which brought self-confidence among Koreans which resulted in a less emotional attitude toward Japan.

The two countries, and both governments have declared 2005 to be the Japanese-Korean Friendship Year, part of an effort to strengthen amity and understanding between their peoples.”<sup>33)</sup> Michael R. Auslin claims that “a Japan-South Korea relationship reminiscent of the Franco-German relationship of the 1950s, which presaged the slow growth of a viable partnership between two formerly implacable enemies and eventually led to regional transformations unimaginable just decades previously.”<sup>34)</sup>

## Middle Level

South Korea-Japan textbook consultations started in 1976 although they could not make major progress. In the 1990s, textbook dialogues became active. There are various channels of dialogues related to history education today such as joint research and symposiums sponsored by research organizations, teacher-level exchanges of reports on classroom activities, student-level associations, government-assisted dialogues and so on. One of them is the Japan-South Korea Joint Study Group on History Textbooks. It started in 1989, which subjected the issues of war, citizenship, and imperialism to cross-national study. It was successful compared to the previous attempts. One of the reasons for the success is that it was organized without the direct involvement of either the Korean or Japanese government.<sup>35)</sup>

Still, many of the scholars involved in the joint textbook research maintained that a common Korean-Japanese textbook would be impossible at least in the near future. The first reason for the difficulties lies in differences involving the relative historical importance of



each nation for the other, and the discrepancies to be carried over directly into textbooks of the two countries. While Japanese textbooks treat Korea as peripheral and rather focus on Europe and the United States, Korean textbooks deal with its modern history mostly in relationship with Japan. For example, in the part of explaining culture, Korean textbooks include description of anti-Japanese culture such as literature and music which developed under Japan's colonial rule. The second reason is the different textbook production systems between Japan and Korea. "Japan uses a state screening and certification system and supports about twenty history textbooks at the high school level"<sup>36)</sup> whereas "Korea uses a single state-authored history textbook."<sup>37)</sup> Even though it would be difficult to publish a joint textbook, it would be greatly worth conducting joint research so that historians and teachers could address the biases which two people might have and deepen the mutual understanding.

### Grassroots

The grassroots level is largely influenced by the political climate at the top level. For example, when Kim Dae Jung's visited Japan in 1998, the mutual relations between individual Koreans and Japanese dramatically improved in business, universities and in tourism. Public polls in Korea reflected a marked increase in positive attitudes toward Japan. But the progress stopped when the Japanese history textbook which tried to minimize Japan's past aggression appeared in 2001.<sup>38)</sup>

Some claim that the many decades of anti-Japanese history education in Korea "have inculcated such deeply felt public antipathy toward Japan that even for leaders of vision, to reach out to Japan might mean risking denunciation at home."<sup>39)</sup>

Nevertheless, reconciliation at the grassroots level is much improved between Japan and Korea. A Japan-Korea Cultural Exchange Council was established in 1999, high school exchange programmes have increased, and a lot of Japanese popular culture from films to music has entered Korea and improved Korean people's understanding of Japanese culture after the release of the restrictions on import of Japanese culture by the Korean government. Now, both Japanese and Korean television frequently show popular culture of the other country. Tourism between the two has grown, major Japanese cities now conspicuously sport Korean-language signs at tourist sites, rail stations, and department stores.<sup>40)</sup>

Although the grassroots communication has been progressed, one of the problems they are facing is their asymmetrical relationship. While there are a large number of Korean students in Japanese colleges and universities, only a small number of Japanese are interested in studying in Korea. The reasons for the asymmetry are, firstly, Japan's colonial rule and, secondly, Japan's higher economic prosperity. Still, it is desirable that the direct encountering of the two peoples and cultural exchanges are increasing.

In sum, in order to bring about a true reconciliation, it needed to be addressed by actors at all the levels in both societies.



## Conclusion

The process of reconciliation between Japan and its neighbours has been much slower when compared to Europe. The obstacles for Japan's reconciliation with its neighbours are a combination of both domestic and international environment, and also both material and emotional elements: Domestic environment such as Japanese right-wing revisionism and lack of democracy in Korea and China; international environment such as the Cold War and its end; material element such as the use of the "historical card" to increase aid; and emotional element such as deep rooted historical enmity. However, after the end of the Cold War, the new international environment has been forcing Japan to face its past more sincerely. Also, the growth of the civil society movement in Japan and Korea and growing democracy in Korea will work as positive factors for reconciliation. The reconciliation between Japan and China is not easy yet, but if there would be the precedents of successful reconciliation between Japan and South Korea, it would offer a positive example for the one between Japan and China.

## 4 Germany's and Japan's Post-WWII Reconciliation Processes Compared

In the previous chapters, Germany's and Japan's reconciliation with their neighbouring countries was evaluated separately. The discussions were developed based on the four pillars of Lederach's concept of reconciliation: truth, justice, mercy and peace. This section compares Germany's and Japan's reconciliation processes based on the findings of the previous chapter, clarifying the reasons why Germany has achieved more and Japan has less successful reconciliation with its neighbouring countries. In addition, it is to be discussed if there are some lessons which Japan could learn from the German experience.

### 4-1 Truth

Revealing the truth is the first step to reconciliation. While Germany has come close to consensus on its past aggression, Japan is still engaged in fierce domestic battles over the responsibility for Japan's aggression during wartime and the treatment of colonial subjects.<sup>41)</sup> The German government admitted that Germany was responsible for the Holocaust and that it was their moral obligation to make reparations as early as 1951. In contrast, it took the Japanese government forty eight years after the war had ended, in 1993, to offer its first apology.<sup>42)</sup>

Some claim that it may be natural that Germany confronted its past more sincerely than Japan because the Holocaust is an obvious crime against humanity which Japan did not commit. However, although genocidal intent was unique to the Nazis, Japan's war atrocities were no less than those of Nazi Germany. Some argue that casualties and destruction in Asia exceeded those in Europe, and Japan was guilty of crimes which even the Nazis did not commit such as trading in opium to finance its puppet governments, bacteriological warfare and the scorched-earth policies.<sup>43)</sup>

Yet, it would be exaggerating to claim that the Japanese government has done nothing

to accept its responsibility. For example, it constructed several memorials “to mark sites where atrocities had been committed by troops. One such memorial can be found in Singapore where between 4,000 and 5,000 adult Chinese males were massacred in 1942.”<sup>45)</sup> Furthermore, the Japanese government has assisted in “the removal of thousands of poison gas shells left behind by the Imperial Army throughout North China. Poison, leaking through deteriorating shell casings, has flowed into local water supplies, causing deaths and injury. The Japanese government is funding the construction of a detoxification plant in North China and is cooperating fully with China in the removal of the shells.”

Still, compared to Germany, Japan has had a much greater difficulty to reach a consensus on its war responsibility because of the political power game which is rooted in the high degree of continuity of political leadership of the pre-war and post-war periods as well as lack of scholarly research.

#### 4-2 Justice

The Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals are similar in the sense that both tribunals were judged under the victors’ justice, and both sacrificed justice for the sake of the allied powers’ political will. However, they are quite different in the following points: The Nuremberg tribunal had greater moral force than the Tokyo trial because the former judged the most culpable individuals fairly. In contrast, the Tokyo trial failed because it did not prosecute the Emperor but indicted the military commanders instead.<sup>46)</sup> The Allied victors kept not only the Japanese Emperor but also many of his advisers in power to ensure stability, while they demanded that the postwar German government eliminate the Nazi leadership. The continuity of personnel permitted in Japan made it difficult to prosecute war crimes further and to acknowledge Japan’s past aggression.<sup>47)</sup>

Another comparable issue in respect to justice is compensation to former forced labourers. The Japanese government has refused to compensate forced labourers based on the claim that the “San Francisco Peace Treaty put an end to any legal liability on the part of either Japan or its nationals, including companies, toward those who were employed as forced laborers during World War II.”<sup>48)</sup> On the contrary, the German government established a foundation in order to provide compensation to forced labourers who are mostly from Eastern Europe. Explaining the differences between the two countries’ compensation policies, Gebhard Hielscher says:

The German compensation payments are based not on established legal claims, but on a new law passed by the German parliament in July 2000 to set up a foundation financed jointly by government and industry. In other words, it is not a matter of legalistic arguments but of the political will to come to terms with the past and pay at least something for it.<sup>49)</sup>

In Japan, comparable political will to confront its own past has been lacking, which, as a result, prevented Japan from pursuing justice towards its neighbours.

#### 4-3 Mercy

Germany has made efforts to apologize sincerely, pay compensation and earn the trust from its neighbours. In contrast, Japanese political leaders' attitudes often offended its neighbours, and as a result they failed to obtain mercy from them. One of the examples of such is the Yasukuni issue.

Repeated visits to the Yasukuni Shrine by Japanese government officials made Japanese neighbours angry and created a fierce protest by Asian people. The Japanese government claims that the visit should not be a problem because all the dead become Gods in Shinto religion regardless of their goodness or badness. However, victims argue that "a shrine visit would be equivalent to a German chancellor visiting a memorial dedicated to Hitler and his Nazi henchmen."<sup>50)</sup> If Japanese government officials really wish that Japan would be forgiven by its Asian neighbours, Japan should establish another national war memorial excluding war criminals.

Another comparable issue related to mercy is the divergent level of readiness and maturity on the part of victimized countries. Reconciliation can be progressed only with the cooperation of both victimizers and victims. While victimizers need to acknowledge the past atrocities and pay compensation, the society of the victim needs to be ready for forgiveness. It is difficult to progress reconciliation with the country which has an authoritarian regime or an immature democracy. France might have relatively easily got ready for reconciling with Germany because it was enjoying a mature democracy and civil society in the post-WWII era. The mature democracy helps bilateral relationships by enforcing interaction, popular channels of communication at nongovernmental level, cultural and educational exchanges, and institutional familiarity.<sup>51)</sup> On the contrary, Korea had been under military authoritarianism until the late 1980s, which is perceived to have made reconciliation with Japan complicated.

#### 4-4 Peace

As discussed in the first chapter, the concept of peace can be distinguished between negative peace and positive peace. In both Europe and Asia, negative peace was achieved at the end of the WWII. Yet, to what extent positive peace was achieved is different between Europe and Asia. It can be said that Europe has achieved a high degree of positive peace by establishing the EU where states share a common future. On the contrary, Asia has not reached positive peace yet, because truth has not been told, justice has not been pursued, and mercy has not been given to the past aggressor, Japan.

Still, optimists see that Japan now has a greater incentive for building friendly relationships with its neighbours, facing the shifting balance of power in the Asian region. Especially, Japan and South Korea are strengthening their ties as they share similar political and economic systems such as the most stable democracies and most developed free-market economies in Asia. Michael R. Auslin claims that they should build a regional core, which resembles the rapprochement between France and Germany after the World War II.<sup>52)</sup> The

bilateral trends between the two countries are strongly encouraging.

#### 4-5 Top Level

Both the Asian and European cases show that processes of reconciliation have greatly progressed under the right political leadership. Still, the divergent way how both countries' leaders tried to retain trust of the international community influenced their relationship with neighbouring countries. While Germany's leaders tried to retain trust through the rapprochement with France and commitment to European unification, Japan's leaders did this by building a strong tie with the US.

Another issue that Germany's and Japan's cases have proved is that actors of the top level are connected to and influence the ones at the middle level and at the grassroots. Political leaders at the top level wish to maintain the support from their own constituencies, and cannot ignore the grassroots movement. On the contrary, the political leaders may have influence on mass media and education, which could impact on people's emotions and way of behaviour. It can be said that Europe achieved a higher degree of reconciliation than Asia, because actors at all three levels worked better.

#### 4-6 Middle Level

History teachers and scholars who are engaged in textbook consultations are the main actors which belong to the middle level in both countries. Germany has already completed bilateral negotiations on historical controversial issues both with France and Poland and now focuses on creating a foundation of common values for the European Union and including cultural diversity such as non Western values into textbooks. In contrast to Germany, Japan still has a fierce argument over the treatment of the war in its history textbooks.

There are several reasons why the history textbook issue has been much more controversial in Japan than in Germany. Firstly, since the German government acknowledged the past aggression at an early stage, it was easily reflected in history textbooks. In contrast, the Japanese government's attitude has been far more ambiguous for a long time. The Japanese Ministry of Education finally approved a brief mention of the comfort women in junior high school textbooks as late as the 1990s after the prime minister's apology on this issue.

Secondly, while Japanese textbooks teach the importance of peace and democracy based on the great sufferings during the war time (especially the atomic bombing in Hiroshima), they do not write much about what Japan did in its neighbouring countries. As a result, Japanese young people often lack proper knowledge about the aggressive side of their history, which has been one of the reasons for hampering mutual understanding between themselves and their neighbouring countries. In contrast, German textbooks deal with the Nazi past broadly and deeply, and then explicitly condemn it.

Thirdly, Germany and Japan have different structures of control over history textbooks. While Japan's national government has directly supervised and censored

textbooks, Germany doesn't have any central control system. Furthermore, in China and Korea, government officials actually write the textbooks themselves. In those countries, textbooks provide authoritative statements of national policy, which makes history textbook consultation difficult.

Fourthly, Germany accepted international pressure to revise their textbook accounts more easily compared to Japan.<sup>53)</sup> For example, "one curriculum on Hitler for high school students was rewritten after the Israeli government protested that it was insufficiently critical of the Third Reich."<sup>54)</sup>

Yet, increasing joint textbooks consultations between Japan and Korea indicate that there is a growing opportunity to progress reconciliation, especially in the field of scholarly research. The German experience shows that research institutes like the Georg-Eckert-Institute in Braunschweig can provide "much of the intellectual underpinning for resolution of historical problem."<sup>55)</sup> In Japan, there have been attempts to establish a similar kind of research institute, for example, by some professors and by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama, which have been regrettably shelved.<sup>56)</sup> Yet, some small private museums such as the Peace, Human Rights and Children Centre / the School Textbook Institute founded in 1997 in Osaka started to take initiative to exhibit Japan's aggression and school textbooks.<sup>57)</sup> In order to promote mutual understanding, those initiatives should get more citizens' and scholars' support and be developed into a research institute of the kind of Georg-Eckert-Institute. Since lack of scholarly research is one of the reasons for domestic as well as international discontent on Japan's war time atrocities, the idea of a research institute should be strongly supported as a means to advance reconciliation.

#### 4-7 Grassroots

In the border areas between Germany and its neighbours, grassroots reconciliation has progressed by practical incentives, whereas Japan as an island didn't share borders with neighbours. Also, Germany and its neighbouring countries have developed more activities which could foster reconciliation. Among them, exchange programmes for young people have been prominent. Although Japan and Korea/China have also developed those activities, Japanese schools, universities and cities have preferred exchanges with the ones in the US or Europe rather than Asia. This is partly because of the Japanese admiration for the Western world and the disrespect for less developed countries, and partly because of the influence of the top level politicians who look to the US rather than Asia.

However, there are some positive examples to indicate a changing attitude of Japanese people, which may help Japan reconcile with its neighbours. One of those examples is emerging positive feelings in Japan toward South Korea. In 2003, a Korean soap opera broadcasted on Japanese television, triggered a Korean boom in Japan. New generations which are not constrained by old bias stemming from harsh history, may be grasping opportunities for mutual understanding between the two peoples although they need to be supported by other positive movements at the top level and the middle level of both

societies.

#### 4-8 Causes of Differences in Reconciliation Processes

Reasons for Japan's relatively unsuccessful reconciliation could be explained with reference to the following three aspects; Firstly, the Japanese government is still reluctant to take the responsibility for its past atrocities and thus truth has not been acknowledged yet; secondly, justice has not been achieved because the war criminals were not prosecuted enough and compensation has not been paid by the state; thirdly, Japanese neighbours think that Japan has not shown real remorse and thus mercy has not been given to Japan.

These differences arise from different international contexts where the two countries were situated as well as their domestic contexts. Firstly, the Cold War promoted reconciliation between Germany and France, while it prevented Japan from reconciling with its Asian neighbours. Particularly the United States' decision to allow Japan the continuity of political leadership prevented Japan from making a domestic basis for prosecuting war crimes.

Secondly, the Holocaust provided a moral obligation for the Germans to confront the past while the Japanese could easily forget country's past wrongdoings by seeing itself as the victim of the atomic bombings.

Thirdly, in Germany, actors at the middle level and grassroots level of society worked better as well as the ones at the top level. The strong political leadership, the long history of history textbook commissions, support from the Catholic church and peoples' communication in the border areas all served as a driving force for reconciliation.

Fourthly, regional dimension greatly affects the process of reconciliation. A commitment to regional integration became a big incentive for reconciliation in Germany. On the other hand, the Asian region has not provided attractive incentives for Japan to commit to the region so far. Regional integration could promote reconciliation. On the processes of promoting regional integration, member states need to reconcile their divergent views on various policies before achieving a common large goal of regional integration. Furthermore, as regional integration advances, people might share common values, history and education, which would promote creating a regional identity and which, as a result, would contribute to reconciliation. Also, as regional integration would progress, people's encounter in the region would increase. As reconciliation is ultimately related to persons on the grassroots level, those encounters could provide greater opportunities for reconciliation.

#### Conclusion

The international context in the post-WWII period influenced the political priorities of the two states differently. While it worked favourably for post-WWII reconciliation in Europe, it disturbed Japan from coming to terms with its past aggression. Especially, political continuity between the pre- and post-war periods made it difficult for the Japanese government to admit its past wrongdoings. Also, the Japanese people's continuing sense of

victimization as a result of the atomic bombing became an obstacle for Japan to confront its aggressive side.

Nonetheless, in the 1990s, responding to the growing international pressure on Japan to acknowledge its past wrongs and successive apologies by several Japanese political leaders, the aggressor consciousness was widely developed in Japan. “Numerous books, lectures and symposiums have more explicitly than before adopted the aggressor perspective in discussing Japan’s involvement in the war. A significant number of organisations have issued a statement of apology to Japan’s victims in Asia and other regions based on such a standpoint.”<sup>58)</sup> To admit one’s own wrongdoings is the first step of reconciliation. Thus it can be said that these are positive indications for Japan’s serious pursuit for reconciliation with its neighbouring countries. Yet, the growing aggressor consciousness has often been attacked by Japanese right wingers, and fear for the attack prevented some peace museums from exhibiting Japan’s aggression. In order that Japanese society continues to address the underlying causes of conflicts and attain positive peace, it needs to overcome those nationalistic movements.

Still, looking at the optimistic side, the recent international context is working favourably for reconciliation. Reconciliation is not an issue restricted to Japan and Germany, but is becoming a global trend now.<sup>59)</sup> The end of the Cold War and legal instruments such as Truth and Reconciliation Commissions enabled active assertion of individual human rights. Also, the international community has become increasingly involved in the process of dealing with the past legacy of war. Furthermore, technological advance in the Internet has helped individual empowerment and enabled victims’ claims to reach a global audience.<sup>60)</sup> Now, coming to terms with the past is becoming a universal political necessity and moral obligation for democratic societies. The international society does not allow the state to ignore its past atrocities any more. As the Human Rights issue becomes a universal value, achieving justice for past Human Rights violations becomes also a universal obligation.

There is no universal model for reconciliation, since it depends largely on internal as well as external factors. Yet, it can be said that achieving reconciliation is a long-term process, whose success is ultimately dependent on the peoples’ mutual understanding at the grassroots level. There is no quick solution for the victims to forget the past wounds. Only the collaborative efforts at all the levels of the society can contribute to reconciliation.

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